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Abstract
This paper argues that the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) cross country correla­
tions and observed time series correlations between national saving and domestic 
investment may be a consequence of government spending patterns. I analyze 
the effects of government consumption in an intertemporal equilibrium model 
with both tradable and nontradable goods. When government consumption falls 
largely on nontradables the model’s predictions are consistent with a number of 
empirical observations in OECD countries.
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1 In tro d u ctio n
A number of empirical studies find a strong positive cross country correlation between 
long-term national saving rates and domestic investment rates of the industrialized 
countries in the OECD. The strong intracountry correlation is a puzzle that many 
economists have tried to solve in the past decade. If a country can borrow and lend in 
international capital markets, why should domestic sources of funds seem to matter so 
much for its investment? What makes the puzzle especially vexing is the apparent high 
degree of short term capital mobility, which suggests that savings should be allocated 
efficiently among world investment opportunities.
The reason for the correlation between domestic sources and uses of funds has 
important implications for theory and policy. Some economists use the pattern as a 
convenient excuse for making closed economy assumptions. Bacchetta and Feldstein 
(1989), for example, have appealed to the pattern to buttress arguments in favor of 
domestic tax policies to stimulate saving. If a country is effectively closed, they ar­
gue, tax advantages for saving will boost future domestic productivity. Despite the 
importance of the saving-investment correlations, we currently know little about why 
they exist. These patterns, first noted by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) (FH), have 
prompted numerous explanations, none of which is entirely satisfactory.
Feldstein and Horioka’s initial interpretation, that the evidence is inconsistent with 
freely mobile capital, is dubious. For example, Obstfeld (1986) develops a life cycle 
model which, when simulated, yields regression results similar to those found by FH. 
In his model capital is freely mobile but economic growth determines both saving and 
investment, leading them to be highly correlated. Summers (1986), however, finds that 
empirically growth is not the third factor responsible for the S-I association. Instead, he 
rind others (Westphal (1983), Tobin (1983), Fieleke (1982)) suggest that governments 
deliberately target the current account through monetary and fiscal policies designed to 




























































































in different countries would choose so consistently to restrict current accounts, which 
simply reflect intertemporal trade.
Bovenberg (1989) demonstrates that if goods are imperfect substitutes in consump­
tion, domestic investment incentives can cause changes in welfare and interest rates 
that stimulate savings, even if financial capital is perfectly mobile. Although his 2- 
country model rationalizes a close time series link between saving and investment for 
countries that affect world commodity prices, it does little to clear up the puzzle for 
small countries.
A further promising line of research is Frankel’s suggestion (1986) that the close 
saving-investment association is the result of imperfect integration of goods markets 
rather than financial markets. Consumption and investment depend on real interest 
rates but real interest rate parity fails when some goods are not traded and can result 
in crowding out. In fact, empirical tests have generally provided evidence against 
the hypothesis of real interest parity, which suggests that international commodity 
markets are not perfectly integrated (for example, Mishkin (1984), Cumby and Mishkin 
(1986)). Work by Murphy (1986), Engel and Kletzer (1989) and Wong (1990) have 
all showed that the existence of nontraded commodities can give rise to a saving- 
investment link. However, it remains to be determined what is responsible for the 
cross country differences in saving and investment behavior and what is the source of 
shocks - technological, monetary, fiscal - that gives rise to their comovements over time. 
Real business cycle models have emphasized highly persistent productivity shocks as a 
possible candidate (see Baxter and Crucini (1990), Finn (1990), Cardia (1991)).
In this paper I argue that government consumption is an important common factor 
determining saving and investment rates and may be responsible for both the cross 
sectional correlations and observed time series behavior. I construct a theoretical model 
of a small open economy that demonstrates how public spending affects investment, 




























































































the rest of the world and compare model predictions with observed data. Because 
government consumption falls primarily on nontradables, I incorporate Frankel’s idea 
that imperfect integration of goods markets, not financial capital markets, is important 
to understand the saving-investment link.
The framework is an intertemporal equilibrium model with both tradable and non­
tradable goods. Output, saving and investment decisions axe derived from optimiz­
ing behavior, while government behavior is exogenous. I modify models developed in 
Dornbusch (1983), Bovenberg (1986) and Frenkel and Razin (1986a,b). In contrast to 
Frenkel and Razin or Dornbusch, investment and output are endogenous so we can 
explore the interaction between capital accumulation and consumption. Bovenberg 
incorporates endogenous investment but analyzes a model with two large countries, 
while here I consider a small country that cannot affect world prices.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II compiles a list of empirical observa­
tions using an updated data set. Section III presents a two period model to analyze 
how the time pattern and composition of government consumption affect household 
consumption and domestic capital accumulation. In section IV the model is extended
to the infinite horizon case and I show conditions under which cross country differences
%
in longrun government consumption give rise to differences in steady state saving and 
investment rates. The existence of a nontraded goods sector is critical in generating 
this result. Conclusions appear in section V.
2 D a ta  A n a ly s is
The data employed are annual observations from OECD National Income Accounts 
and cover the years 1965-1985 for 24 countries. Savings is calculated as a residual, 
gross national product minus private and government consumption. Investment is 
measured as gross fixed capital formation plus the change in stocks. In computing 




























































































nonstationarity problems . Table 1 reports contemporaneous time series correlations. 
Table 2 provides one long run average observation for each country of national saving 
(S), gross domestic investment (I) and current account rates (BCA). Also included are 
BCA/S and -BCA/I which are, respectively, the average proportion of national saving 
accounted for by capital outflows and the average proportion of domestic investment 
accounted for by capital inflows. Table 3 reports sample correlation matrices of means 
and standard deviations for these variables. I summarize the content of these tables 
into two groups of observations.
TIME SERIES OBSERVATIONS
Fact 1: For many countries the contemporaneous time series correlation 
between national saving and domestic investment rates is positive.
Although most countries have positive correlations, there is considerable hetero­
geneity across countries regarding the magnitude of the association and the correlations 
are usually quite far from the value of 1 implied by complete capital immobility. For 
some economies divergences between saving and investment have at times exceeded 10 
percent of GDP.
The last 4 columns of Table 1 report contemporaneous correlations between gov­
ernment consumption rates and private consumption rates, saving rates and the two 
components of saving rates: investment and current account rates. For 16 of the 24 
countries there is a negative relationship between government and private consump­
tion rates. Noticeable exceptions are the four largest economies, U.S., Japan, West 
Germany and France. In all cases we observe:
Fact 2: W ithin individual countries there exists a negative contemporane­





























































































There is wider variation regarding the association between government consump­
tion and the two components of saving but in most countries government consumption 
and investment rates also move in opposite directions.
CROSS SECTION OBSERVATIONS
Fact 3: Average national saving rates and average domestic investment rates 
are positively correlated.
The correlation between average saving and investment rates is positive, but has 
fallen relative to the original Feldstein-Horioka findings of 0.88.
Fact 4: For countries with high average saving rates, the difference between 
average saving and investment rates is high.
Fact 5: For countries with high average saving rates, a higher fraction of 
saving flows abroad.
Fact 6: Countries with more highly variable saving rates also have more 
highly variable investment and current account rates.
An analysis of the variance of the pooled saving rate series (21x23 observations 
since Luxembourg is omitted), however, establishes that there is much more variation 
across individuali countries than there is across time. The following decomposition of 
the series (y),i is used:
s
( p )a  =  «'( +  »/<+£.< * =  1, ...23, f =  1, ...21 (1)
where is the country effect, r/t is the time effect, and e,( is the purely random effect. 
70% of this series’ total variation can be attributed to variation across countries, while 




























































































again there is more variation across countries than across time. 55% is accounted for 
by country effect and 14% by time effects. This suggests that there is some underlying 
long run difference in the structure of national economies.
Given the earlier time series findings, differences in long run average government 
consumption emerge as a plausible candidate responsible for the cross country differ­
ences in long run investment and saving rates. There is a negative correlation, -0.43, 
between average government expenditure rates and average domestic investment rates, 
significant at a 95% confidence level. The correlation between government expenditure 
and saving rates is also negative but different from zero only at an 80% confidence level 
using a two tailed t-test.
Having reexamined relationships among saving, investment and current account 
rates in OECD countries, I suggest that although both cross section and time series S-I 
correlations are positive, this need not to be the consequence of low capital mobility. 
In fact, it should be noted that even with perfect capital mobility we should not be 
surprised to observe a high positive cross sectional correlation between saving and 
investment rates when they are averaged over very long periods of time. Since the 
current account, which reflects intertemporal trade, is equal to the change in a country’s 
net external indebtedness, these changes must cumulate to zero over time unless the 
country defaults on its loans (or, if it is a net lender, is willing never to be paid 
back). Moreover, for many economies time series correlations between saving and 
investment rates are substantially different from the value of 1 implied by complete 
capital immobility. Countries such as Ireland, New Zealand, Denmark and Greece 
have run large current account deficits for periods of time exceeding a decade.
Based on the above empirical observations, instead I suggest that government con­
sumption may be an important common factor determining both saving rate and in­
vestment rates. In the next section I construct a structural model that demonstrates 




























































































saving. The descriptive statistics compiled above provide a set of empirical regularities 
with which I can compare the predictions of the artificial economy for consistency.
3 T h e  M o d e l
The economy lasts for two periods. Agents are all identical and have preferences 
over two goods, a tradable and a nontradable. In the first period agents receive an 
endowment of each of the two goods and decide how much to consume and how much 
to save to augment second period consumption. The goods are perishable but savings 
can be done either through lending to domestic firms or to the rest of the world in the 
form of a freely traded bond. The country is small in the markets for tradable goods 
and internationally traded bonds. The relative price of period t nontradable goods in 
terms of period t tradable goods (the real exchange rate) is given by Pt, t = 1,2. 
The world rate of interest is fixed in terms of tradable goods and denoted by r. The 
home country can borrow or lend unlimited amounts at the rate r, subject to the 
intertemporal trade balance constraint.
3.1 P rod u ction
During the first period firms in either sector can borrow to invest in new capital which 
will become productive the following period. We assume that the investment good is 
nontradable. Unlike other models in which the investment good is tradable (see for 
example Zeira (1987), Bovenberg (1989), Wong (1990), Cardia (1991)), this assumption 
makes clear the distinction between financial capital mobility and physical capital 
mobility. While clearly a simplification, it is motivated by the observation that a large 
part of investment is in the form of home goods such as transportation systems, schools 
to develop human capital and buildings, rather than just transportable machinery. 
For example, in 1980 in the U.S. residential and nonresidential building plus land 




























































































period the capital is combined with labor to produce tradable and nontradable goods. 
Domestic output of each good is produced with a constant returns to scale production 
function according to:
Yt =  G(Kt , Lt ) =  Trs(fcr) (2)
Yn  =  F (K n ,L n ) =  LNf{k N) (3)
where kx = is the capital-labor ratio in the tradable goods sector and k^  is the 
capital-labor ratio in the nontradable goods sector. It is assumed that > 0
and < 0. Similar assumptions are made for the technology of the nontradable
sector. While labor is freely mobile between the two sectors, total labor supply is fixed 
and equal to L so that ijv +  Lk =  L.
Firms choose inputs to maximize profits:
Max IIjv = Pi F{Kn ,L n ) — wLn — P\(^ + r )K s  (4)
Max n T =  G(KT,L T ) - w L T - P i { l  + r)K T (5)
Optimality of firms’ decisions requires that labor adjusts until the value of the 
marginal product in terms of tradable goods is the same in each industry and that 
investment takes place in each industry until the marginal products equal the marginal 
cost of capital.
3.2 G overnm ent
The government exogenously consumes an amount Gjvi of nontradables and Grt of 
tradables in period t which it finances through lump sum taxation Zt of households 
in the period it is consumed. Since the analysis is purely positive, there is no explicit 
government objective and we require only that the government satisfy its period budget 
constraint:




























































































3.3 H ousehold  P references
The representative household consumes tradables and nontradables which are imperfect 
substitutes. Instantaneous utility has the functional form:
1U = i i—i
1 - 7  1 
/ ’ _  /~ia ^f(l-o)
(7)
0 < a < l ,  7 > 0
Here L is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If L tends to infinity, [/(.) is 
nearly linear and consumers substitute consumption very easily over time. If i  is close 
to zero, intertemporal substitutability is very low and agents smooth consumption.
Given expectations of taxes and prices, the representative household chooses con­
sumption (Cn i ,C t i ,C n 2,Ct2) aIKl end of period bond holdings B  to maximize dis­
counted lifetime utility. Labor is supplied inelastically in the second period at the wage 
w.
M ax V  = U(Cm ,Cn ) + f)U(CN2,CT2) (8)
subject to
PiCm + C n + B <  P\En\ + Et\ — Z\ (9)
T2GW2 T GV2 ^  (1 + r)L? T wL — Z% (10)
Combining the constraints we get the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint:
P2CN2 d- Ct2 ^  WL ~~ E2 d- (1 d- r)(PiEi -(- Ej i  — Z\ — P\C^\ — Ct i) (11) 
Intertemporal optimality for the household problem requires that:
ilfe - <12)
where Ct is composite consumption at time t. The right hand side term of equation 
(12) is the domestic real rate of interest measured in terms of the domestic consumption 




























































































of nontradables changes over time. With the above functional form for the utility func­
tion, equation (12) can be inverted to solve for the households’ optimal consumption 
profile:
^  =  [ ^ ( l + r ) ( § H ^  (13)
U2 P 2
The degree to which variations in the relative price of nontradables affect the con­
sumption profile depends on a, the share of nontradable good expenditures in total 
consumption expenditures. Changes in the relative price of nontradables are more im­
portant when they compose a large proportion of total consumption spending. The 
effect of price variations also depends on L, which determines how consumers adjust 
consumption over time in response to real interest rate changes.
3.4 E quilibrium
Let Z  be the vector of taxes Z = (ZJt Z2). A perfect foresight equilibrium is given by a 
vector of prices P" = (P*. P2, w*), consumption allocations C* =  C^2l Cfi, C f2), 
bond holdings B* and domestic resource allocations A* = (L*Nl i f ,  K}) such that, 
given their expectations of P, Z, and r
(i) households choose consumption C* =  C(P, Z , r) and bond holdings B * =  B(P, Z, r)
to maximize discounted lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint.
(ii) firms choose resource allocations A* =  A(P, Z, r) to maximize profits
(iii) The labor market clears: +  L j  =  L
(iv) The market for nontradables clears each period:
Cff i + P-n + K j  +  Gm  =  Em
C’N2 + GN2 = F(K'„,L'n )
(v) The government budget constraint is satisfied





























































































The equilibrium solution is determined by the household’s and firm’s first order condi­
tions and conditions (iii)-(v) above. In order to calculate an explicit solution assume 
that the production functions are Cobb-Douglas:
Yt  = K lL $ -v) (14)
Yn = K f , L ^ (15)
With these functional forms, equilibrium is determined by the solution to the fol­
lowing system of nonlinear equations:
<* / Cti •.
i - a l cw, '  
Q (—?!)







/ » ( l+ r ) ( § r
(1 +  t)Pi 
(1 +r)Pi
=  (1 - » ) (
Kt
L — L s
Cni +  K t  + Kpi -f Gm











(1 +  r)(Ex\ — Cti ~  G n ) — Gti +  K j(L  — ^  — Cti — 0 (24)
Since the system is nonlinear and no analytical solution exists a numerical procedure 
must be used. Here I employ the Newton-Ralphson method (see Press, et al. (1989)) 




























































































4 G overn m en t C o n su m p tio n  E x p en d itu res
In a small economy if all goods are traded and the country can borrow freely, then 
investment decisions depend only on the exogenous world interest rate and domestic 
technology parameters, irrespective of household consumption or saving decisions (see 
Zeira (1987), Engel and Kletzer (1989)). However, with nontradable goods domestic 
production and investment necessarily depend on consumption of nontradables. Do­
mestic government consumption will then affect domestic investment, both directly, 
and also indirectly through its impact on household consumption choices.
To identify the channels that government fiscal policies which affect saving can, in 
turn, affect investment I present several numerical examples of the above model. The 
focus here is on how the composition of current and anticipated future government 
consumption interacts with the equilibrium real interest rate to determine aggregate 
consumption, domestic capital accumulation and external indebtedness.
Tables 4 and 5 give equilibrium solutions for a reference model and solutions when I 
alter first period government consumption of nontradables, tradables and second period 
government consumption of nontradables, tradables consecutively. Essentially these 
are exercises in comparative dynamics where government consumption is increased in 
turn by 20% of the initial endowment. Rather than presenting results for a particular 
’’realistic” parameterization, I consider three cases in order to assess the sensitivity 
of conclusions to model specification. The model has several free parameters: r, the 
exogenous world interest rate; q and t>, capital’s share in the production of nontrad­
ables and tradables, respectively; a , the household’s share of nontradables in total 
consumption expenditures; /3, the subjective discount factor; and 7, the curvature of 
the period utility function. The tables report results of two extreme cases regarding the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In Table 4 7  = 1000 so agents always choose a 
completely flat consumption profile, regardless of the real interest rate. Table 5 reports 




























































































For each of the two tables f) =  =  0.95, which implies a real rate of 5.3% if we
think of this as a compounded rate over, say, 30 years. Thus it is in line with the his­
torical evidence in the U.S. (see Ibbotson and Sinquefeld (1978)). In case 1 production 
technologies are identical in each industry (q = v =  0.3), and households always spend 
half their consumption expenditures on tradables and half on nontradables (a =  0.5).
I interpret this as a benchmark case. In case 2 production technologies are the same 
as in case 1 but household consumption preferences are biased toward the nontradable 
good (a =  0.6). In case 3 the production of the nontradable good is relatively more 
labor intensive than the tradable good (q =  0.3, v =  0.4).
A few comments to motivate these choices are in order. The range chosen for 
the share of capital in production is in line with historical cross country evidence as 
reported in Backus and Kehoe (1989). Much direct evidence on the relative factor 
intensities of the tradable and nontradable sectors is difficult to obtain but published 
OECD Industrial Structure statistics for Norway and Sweden lend support to the idea 
that nontradables are more labor intensive. 1 Among the OECD countries, the share 
of nontradables in total household consumption spending ranges from a low of .469 for 
the US to a high of .753 for Portugal 2.
Government consumption expenditure affects household consumption patterns through 
two channels. First, a higher level of government spending in either period lowers 
private agents’ disposable income so there is a wealth effect; second, unless the gov-
1 For both countries fabricated metal products (ISIC 38) and chemical products (ISIC 35) account 
for the largest shares of imported goods. In 1982 the ratio of wages and salaries of employees to total 
production of fabricated metal products was .27 for Norway and .34 for Sweden. The same ratio for 
chemical products was .11 for Norway and .15 for Sweden. These ratios for the most highly traded 
goods can be compared to the ratio of wages and salaries to total production in the services sector 
(ISIC 6.90); .36 for Norway and .46 for Sweden.
2I calculate this variable explicitly for each country by dividing final consumption expenditure of 
resident households into 2 groups. Included in the category for tradable goods are: food,beverages, 
and tobacco; clothing and footwear; fuel and power; furniture, furnishings and household equipment; 
transport and communication; and net purchases abroad by resident households. Included in the cat­
egory for nontradables are: medical care and health expenses; gross rent; recreational, entertainment, 




























































































ernment’s propensity to spend on nontradables is identical to the household’s, higher 
public spending in one period alters the relative price of nontradables in terms of trad­
ables in that period. This change in intratemporal prices alters the consumption based 
real rate of return and can cause household’s to tilt consumption towards either the 
current or future period (see Razin (1984) or Frankel and Razin (1987)). The extent 
households tilt their consumption profile depends on the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution.
4.1 Increasing Current G overnm ent C onsum ption  o f N on ­
tradables
First consider the case when households completely smooth consumption (Table 4). A 
temporary rise in current government nontradables consumption causes both saving 
and investment rates to fall, while the current account can either rise or fall. The 
mechanism producing this result is as follows. Higher current government nontradables 
demand both increases the current relative price of nontradables and lowers current 
household disposable income. With lower income current private nontradables demand 
falls, but not enough to offset a rise in P\ because part of the reduction in income is 
shifted to the future. Since aggregate current consumption rises while current output 
remains the same, the national saving rate decreases. Moreover, the rise in Pi raises the 
marginal cost of capital in both sectors and aggregate investment falls. Thus, relative 
to the initial equilibrium, both national saving and domestic investment rates fall. The 
current account response depends on the relative strengths of two opposing effects. The 
drop in household income reduces current tradables demand but the higher current 
relative price of nontradables, a substitute good, raises household tradables demand.
Now consider the other extreme when households make no attempt to smooth 
consumption, but rather alter their consumption profiles greatly in response to even 




























































































current government nontradables consumption causes saving and current account rates 
to rise, while the investment rate response depends on the two sectors’ relative factor 
intensities.
Higher current government nontradables demand would, ceteris paribus, raise Pi, 
thus raising the real interest rate. But since household consumption is perfectly respon­
sive to interest rate movements, consumers tilt consumption towards the future. The 
resulting decline in current nontradables demand puts downward pressure on Pi, and 
the rise in future demand puts upward pressure on Pi so that in the new equilibrium 
(as in the original) relative prices are equalized across time.
When households do not smooth we get the rather perverse result that although 
current household income falls, rather than spreading the requisite reduction in con­
sumption across both periods, households actually increase second period consump­
tion (see Dornbusch (1986)). This higher future consumption directly increases future 
nontradables consumption so more resources must be employed in their production. 
Capital and labor flow out of the tradable sector. The new equilibrium is characterized 
by lower investment in the tradable sector and higher in the nontradable sector. If 
the relative factor intensities are identical, aggregate investment remains unchanged. 
But if the nontradable sector is more labor intensive, investment in that sector rises 
by a proportionately smaller amount than the decrease in the tradable sector. Thus, 
aggregate investment falls (in Table 5 compare column 2 with column 1 when v > q).
Therefore, if households are not concerned with smoothing, higher current govern­
ment nontradables consumption tilts household consumption towards the future. Since 
first period aggregate consumption falls while supplies remain fixed, the equilibrium 
saving rate rises. Aggregate investment rises, falls or remains unchanged depending on 
whether the capital intensity of the nontradable sector is respectively higher, lower or 
the same as the tradable sector. The current account unambiguously improves since 





























































































4.2 Increasing Future G overnm ent C onsum ption  o f N ontrad­
ables
Suppose agents currently learn that future government nontradables consumption will 
be high. If households smooth, then saving, investment and current account rates all 
rise. The expectation of lower future household income reduces, not only future con­
sumption, but also current consumption. Current nontradables demand drops and P\ 
falls, with the decrease greater the greater is the share of nontradables in total con­
sumption demand. This drop in Pi lowers the home real interest rate and decreases 
the marginal cost of capital in both sectors so aggregate investment rises. The coun­
try’s net external indebtedness decreases since present tradables consumption falls in 
response^to both household smoothing and the lower relative price of nontradables, 
while present supply remains fixed.
4.3 D iscussion
While the discussion above focused on situations when government consumption fell 
exclusively on nontradables, similar reasoning can be used to analyze equilibrium re­
sponses to an increase in government consumption of traded goods. Table 6 summarizes 
both the results of the preceding analysis and the effects of an increase in government 
tradables consumption.
We conclude this section by comparing model predictions with observed time series 
behavior of government consumption, saving, investment and current account rates. 
The two period deterministic model provided a minimal framework necessary for a 
dynamic analysis but is clearly insufficient to provide explicit time series stochastic 
correlations. It is, however, useful in making qualitative statements regarding contem­
poraneous comovements among variables. From Table 6 we know these comovements 




























































































government expenditures. Clearly the extreme case of perfect substitutability over time 
is inappropriate. Although empirical estimates of L vary, most studies indicate a high 
degree of consumption smoothing (see Hall 1989). In 1980 in the U.S. government final 
expenditures on nontradables including education, health, social security and welfare 
(not including transfers), housing and community ammenities, recreational, cultural 
and religious affairs, economic services and general public services accounted for 66% 
of total final government expenditure. Remaining expenditures were largely on defense. 
So the most relevant case appears to be the one with low A where government con­
sumption falls primarily on nontradables. Table 7 reports the theoretical correlations 
for this case and the actual contemporaneous correlations.
The empirical investigation of section 2 showed that for all countries (excluding 
Luxembourg) saving and investment rates are positively contemporaneously correlated 
and saving and government consumption rates are negatively contemporaneously cor­
related. The majority of countries also have negative correlations between (jy~' and y_ 
and between - yV| and By*‘- Under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution 
between current and future consumption is low, if government consumption is heavily 
weighted with nontradables, the model generates a positive contemporaneous correla­
tion between saving and investment rates and a negative contemporaneous correlation 
between government consumption and saving rates and government consumption and 
investment rates. Model predictions concerning the correlation between current ac­
count rate and other variables are not unambiguous, but will in general depend on the 
relative magnitudes of all preference and technology parameters.
Thus, with economically plausible parameter values, the theoretical framework pro­
vides qualitative predictions broadly consistent with observed time series correlations 
between saving and investment rates and correlations between government expenditure 




























































































5 G overn m en t C o n su m p tio n  an d  L ong R u n  Sav­
ing  an d  In v estm en t
This section considers an infinite horizon version of the model of section 3 and examines 
how government consumption affects long run saving rind investment rates.
In economies with only tradable goods cross country differences in government con­
sumption financed by lump sum taxation do not lead to national differences in steady 
state investment and saving rates. Since each country is small, it does not affect world 
prices so government consumption does not alter domestic resource allocations. The 
effect of any level of permanent government consumption (regardless of composition) 
is simply to reduce private disposable income and consumption.
With nontradable goods, if the government’s propensity to consume nontradables 
differs from the household’s, relative prices and therefore the resource allocation will be 
affected. Resource allocation is in general important in determining long run aggregate 
domestic investment. Only when factor intensities in the two sectors are identical is 
aggregate investment unaffected. Therefore, cross country differences in government 
consumption requirements can give rise to cross country differences in long run invest­
ment rates. Further, under the widely accepted assumption that the nontradable sector 
is relatively more labor intensive, government consumption and long run investment 
are negatively correlated (see footnote 1).
We retain the assumption that the investment good is nontradable. The result that 
government consumption affects long run investment and saving does not depend on 
this but the sign and magnitude of the correlations do. I ignore the possibly different 
identities of agents who make saving and investment decisions and solve directly for the 
optimal individual consumption plan subject to resource constraints and government 
consumption requirements. Since there are no distortions in the economy, this results 




























































































The optimal planner solves:
oo
Max Z U ( C Nt,CTt) (25)
subject to:




Lni +  Lj t =  L
Km+i =  (1 — b)Km  + Im  
Krt+i =  (1 — S)Krt + Irt
and the intertemporal trade balance constraint
(30)
Assume the production functions (14) and (15).
If we further impose the simplifying assumption j} = Tj^y, then we can solve for the 
steady state solution. In steady state the current account is balanced so 5(+1 — bt = 0 
and national saving equal domestic investment. Steady state investment (and saving)
where ai and a2 are functions of all the model parameters.
If the tradable sector is more labor intensive than the nontradable sector, the signs 
of ai and a2 are ambiguous but will in general depend on the relative magnitudes of v 
and q. If, on the other hand, nontradables are more labor intensive (v > q), then ai is 
unambiguously positive and a2 negative(proof of this is in the appendix). Thus, under 
the accepted assumption that the nontradable good is more labor intensive, the higher 
is government consumption of nontradables, the lower will be steady state domestic 
investment.
is a linear function of government consumption and is given by (see appendix):




























































































We return now to the results of section 2. In addition to the Feldstein-Horioka 
observations that long run average saving rates differ across countries and saving and 
investment rates are positively correlated, we noted the following observations: coun­
tries with highly volatile saving rates have highly volatile investment rates, long run 
average saving and current account rates are positively correlated, countries with high 
long run saving rates tend to have a high proportion of saving flow abroad, and long 
run government consumption is negatively correlated with both long run saving and 
long run investment rates.
To compare the model’s predictions with these stylized facts we consider a hypothet­
ical global economy consisting of a large number of small national economies identical 
in every respect except their permanent level of government consumption. Differences 
in government consumption requirements cause differences in their long run invest­
ment. In the stationary equilibrium national saving equals domestic investment so 
these two are perfectly correlated. Thus, the first two observations emerge naturally 
as steady state outcomes when government consumption acts as a third factor driving 
both saving and investment.
For most countries government purchases are heavily weighted with output from the 
nontradable sector, primarily services. Expenditure on health, education and public 
order and safety are all large shares of final government spending. If nontradables are 
relatively more labor intensive to produce, the model predicts a negative correlation 
between government consumption and investment, which is what we observe in the 
data.
Because the current account reflects intertemporal trade among countries, a steady 
state analysis cannot explain the observed correlations between the current account 
balances and other variables. A stochastic dynamic economy (along the lines of Bax­





























































































6 C on clu sio n
This paper argued that the Feldstein and Horioka ’’puzzle” might be explained by 
the important role government spending plays in the determination of saving, invest­
ment and current account behavior. Using an intertemporal equilibrium model it was 
shown that variation across countries in long run government consumption gives rise to 
national differences in long run saving and investment and variation in government con­
sumption over time induces comovements over time in saving and investment within a 
country. The model’s qualitative predictions are found to be consistent with a number 
of empirical observations.
Because these results emerge in an economy with perfect capital mobility, I find that 
neither of the conclusions reached by Feldstein and Horioka’s initial study are justified. 
In particular, (i) a high cross country correlation between saving and investment rates 
is perfectly consistent with high capital mobility, and (ii) the observation that long 
run average saving and investment are equal does not imply that the economy can 
be treated as closed when making policy. While it is true that countries successful in 
stimulating savings are likely to significantly increase investment, the type of policies 
effective in stimulating savings are unlikely to be the same in an open economy as those 
in a closed. The underlying model must be taken into account when evaluating the 





























































































In this appendix I
(i) derive the steady state solution for the optimization problem given in the section
4.
(ii) demonstrate that steady state domestic investment (and therefore saving) is a
linear function of government consumption of tradables and nontradables, and
(iii) show that if the nontradable sector is relatively more labor intensive than the 
tradable sector (v > q), then steady state investment is a decreasing function of 
government consumption of nontradables and an increasing function of govern­
ment consumption of tradables.
From section 4 we know that the optimal solution must satisfy the system of equations 











Fx(KNt,LNt) +  ( \ - 6 ) (33)
1 +  r (34)
U2(CN t + 1 i C r i - t - i  ) Gi(Krt+i, Lrt+i) + (1 — 6) (35)
First, substitute equations (26) - (29) into equations (30) and (32) - (35). In steady 
state Cm  =  Cm+uCrt =  CVt+n ^Nt — KNt+u K j t =  Krt+i, +,Y! = L ^ t+1 and L jt = 
Lrt+i- Imposing this, equations (30) and (32) - (35) become:
K}(  1 -  LNf ~ v) - C t - G t 
CiCt
(1  -  a) {K,’NL^-q) -  SKn -  SKt -  GN)
r(~ B 0)
( i  +  0



































































































qK n  ^  + (1 — S) (38) 
1 +  r  (39)
(40)
(1 -  a)(K fiL%-,) -  SKn -  SKt -  GAf)(A'^'~1)(l -  LN) ^ ) v  
a(CT( l - S ) )
We can solve this system of 4 equations ((39) holds true by assumption) for steady 
state Cn ,K n ,K t and L ^. From (40) we have
CT = Aa{ K lL ^ - q) -  S(Kn + K t ) -  GN) K ^ - ' \ l  -  LN) ^  (41)
where
A n  —
t)(l — a)/3
>  0 (42)(1 - P  + 8p)c
Substitute this into equations (36) and (37). The remaining 3 equations can be solved 
simultaneously as
K n  =  A i L n (43)






a 2 = (47)
A3 = 0v(l — a)S .„ ,r ( -B 0) 
(1 - P  + pS)a 1 41 1 + r  ’ (48)





























































































Therefore, steady state investment is:
/*  — +  K ) S A , (
q — v 
1 — qv )l n  +
(1
(1 -  v)q
(51)
or





“ ■ i (54)
which is equation (31) in the text.
Proposition: if v > q, then A2 > 0 and therefore a2 > 0 and at < 0.
Proof: Suppose v > q, then 1 — < 0. 1 — ’ (̂1 — | j l ’|”) > 0 and A2 =
1 +  ^ 0(1— ( 1 ~  — (i'-vjg)) ^  Since As > 0 and A4 > 0, it follows directly
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Canada 0.899 -.687 -.633 .201 -.712
United States 0.753 -.629 -.702 -.067 .108
Japan 0.928 -.864 -.788 .194 .747
Australia 0.593 -.850 -.746 -.563 -.035
New Zealand 0.448 -.564 - .1 0 2 -.436 -.536
Austria 0.889 -.791 -.744 -.191 -.034
Belgium 0.883 -.856 -.720 -.758 .422
Denmark 0.945 -.914 -.863 -.500 -.690
Finland 0.693 -.405 -.424 .162 -.684
France 0.946 -.986 -.938 -.553 .948
Germany 0.905 -.919 -.870 -.099 .481
Greece 0.938 -.457 -.504 -.237 -.549
Iceland 0.337 -.683 -.353 -.204 -.581
Ireland -0.355 -.804 .443 -.678 -.794
Italy 0.483 -.921 -.468 -.409 -.371
Luxembourg -0.028 .657 -.250 .692 .646
Netherlands 0.855 -.909 -.729 -.059 -.133
Norway -0.489 -.155 .133 -.239 -.618
Portugal -0.008 -.797 .242 -.604 .435
Spain 0.697 -.760 -.748 .053 -.774
Sweden 0.914 -.957 -.911 -.512 -.810
Switzerland 0.911 -.828 -.829 .695 .845
Turkey 0.568 .168 -.093 .005 -.567




























































































T a b le  2 : A v e r a g e  L o n g  R u n  R a t e s
Countries S/Y I/Y BCA/Y BCA/S -BCA/I
Canada 0 .222 0.234 -.1 0 1 -.042 0.038
(.016) (.0 2 2 ) (O il) (.051) (.047)
United States 0.199 0.192 -.001 -.005 0 .0 0 2
(.015) (.0 1 2 ) (.0 1 0 ) (.056) (.053)
Japan 0.342 0.332 0.008 0.024 -.026
(.031) (.034) (.014) (.042) (.045)
Australia 0.240 0.264 -.026 -.117 0.099
(.028) (.018) (.019) (.094) (.076)
New Zealand 0.216 0.258 -.035 -.169 0.127
(.026) (.037) (.036) (.160) (.119)
Austria 0.266 0.274 -.006 -.024 0 .022
(.025) (.025) (.0 1 2 ) (.049) (.045)
Belgium 0.217 0.213 -.0 0 2 -.025 0.015
(.040) (.029) (.0 2 2 ) (.115) (.106)
Denmark 0.195 0.222 -.029 -.164 0.138
(.040) (.036) (.0 1 2 ) (.087) (.066)
Finland 0.256 0.270 -.017 -.066 0.059
(.0 2 0 ) (.031) (.0 2 0 ) (.075) (.066)
France 0.239 0.237 -.006 -.029 0.027
(.030) (.024) (.0 1 0 ) (.047) (.044)
Germany 0.256 0.233 0.007 0.028 -.033
(.027) (.028) (.0 1 2 ) (.047) (.052)
Greece 0.199 0.260 -.030 -.165 0 .122
(.034) (.038) (.0 2 0 ) (.136) (.093)
Iceland 0.231 0.269 -.038 -.177 0.131
(.031) (.037) (.040) (.184) (.131)
Ireland 0.159 0.254 -.057 -.424 0.213
(.031) (.032) (.042) (.400) (.142)
Italy 0.214 0 .212 0 .002 0.004 -.0 1 2
(.0 2 1 ) (.0 2 2 ) (.023) (.105) (.105)
Luxembourg 0.452 0.248 0.191 0.388 -.796
(.118) (.033) (.119) (.169) (.498)
Netherlands 0.250 0.237 0.013 0.057 -.064
(.040) (.014) (.0 2 0 ) (.094) (.096)
Norway 0.279 0.293 -.019 -.078 0.045
(.0 2 1 ) (.038) (.051) (.198) (.160)
Portugal 0.158 0.274 -.024 -.249 0.074
(.049) (.038) (.055) (.433) (.188)
Spain 0.209 0.231 -.009 -.047 0.037
(.018) (.025) (.018) (.087) (.078)
Sweden 0.216 0 .220 -.009 -.049 0.043
(.035) (.032) (.016) (.084) (.078)
Switzerland 0.308 0.268 0.027 0.091 -.133
(.025) (.039) (.0 2 2 ) (.078) (.1 0 1 )
Turkey 0.177 0.201 -.0 2 2 0.129 0.104
(.018) (.026) (.0 2 2 ) (.122) (.095)
U.K. 0.196 0.190 -.001 -.006 -.001
(.014) (.019) (.016) (.085) (.081)








































































































Avg S/GDP 1.000 0.611 0.584 0.642 0.609
Avg I/GDP 0.611
(3.53)
































SD S/GDP 1.000 0.618 0.304 0.446 0.370
SD I/GDP 0.618
(3.59)




(2 .8 6 )

















T-Statistics are reported in parenthesis. 




























































































T able 4: E quilibrium  R esp on ses  to  A ltern a tiv e  G overnm ent C on su m p tion  P a ttern s  
w h en  th e  In tertem p ora l E lastic ity  o f  S u b stitu tio n  is 0
Reference G m Gti Gn 2 Gt 2
Case 1 
S/GDP .29 .24 .24 .34 .34
I/GDP .16 .13 .17 .17 .17
BCA/GDP .13 .11 .07 .17 .17
Case 2 
S/GDP .28 .22 .24 .33 .33
I/GDP .13 .10 .14 .14 .14
BCA/GDP .15 .12 .10 .19 .19
Case 3 
S/GDP .30 .26 .26 .35 .36
I/GDP .15 .12 .17 .16 .16
BCA/GDP .15 .14 .09 .19 .19
T able 5: E quilibrium  R esp on ses to  A ltern ative  G overnm ent C on su m p tion  P attern s  
w h en  th ere  is P erfect In tertem p oral S u b stitu tio n  o f  C on su m p tion
Reference Gn i Gti Gn 2 Gt 2
Case 1 
S/GDP .33 .43 .23 .33 .33
I/GDP .17 .17 .17 .17 .17
BCA/GDP .17 .27 .07 .17 .17
Case 2 
S/GDP .45 .51 .35 .45 .45
I/GDP .17 .17 .17 .17 .17
BCA/GDP .28 .34 .18 .28 .28
Case 3 
S/GDP .43 .51 .33 .41 .44
I/GDP .17 .16 .18 .16 .18




























































































T able 6: T h e  Effect o f  a  R ise  in  D o m estic  Sp en ding  on  S avin g, In vestm en t and  C urrent
A ccou n t R ates
Value of I / 7 S/GDP I/GDP BCA/GDP
low I 1 T or j.
Increase in Current
Spending on Nontradables i  if v >  q
high Î = if v =  q 
Î if v <  q
T
low Î î Î
Increase in Future
Spending on Nontradables 1 j  if v >  q 1
high
Î
= if v = q 
Î if v < q T
low i î 1
Increase in Current
Spending on Tradables Î  if v >  q
high i = if v =  q 
1 if v <  q
i
low Î T Î
Increase in Future
Spending on Tradables T Î if v >  q T
high
1
= if v =  q 




























































































T able 7: T h e  M o d e l’s P red ic tion s o f  C on tem p oran eou s C orrelations  
w h en  1/0 is Low




BCA/Y +  or -
+
+  or - +  or -
A ctu a l D a ta  C on term p oran eou s C orrelation  M atrix
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